Social Security Taxation and Intergenerational Risk Sharing Walter Enders and Harvey E. Lapan
The life cycle hypothesis has become the dominant mode used to analyze the effects of a social security system on private saving, the labor/leisure choice, and social welfare. As both Barro and Samuelson indicate, a fully funded Social Security program (in a world of certainty) would drive out an equivalent amount of private saving. If the interest rate is r, the effects of a payment of a dollar into the social security pool while young would just offset* the effects of receiving (1+r) dollars as a transfer when retired.
Papers by Diamond, Hi», and Samuelson, among others, have examined the effects of non-fully funded Social Security schemes in a growing economy. A non-fully funded program can be used to alter the private sector's saving rate and, hence, the capital/labor ratio. Social Security, then, can be used as a policy tool for achieving the (or some variant of the) golden rule growth path. In this regard, an optimal Social Security scheme can be found which will increase the long-run well-being of an economy. Authors such as Feldstein and Hu have argued that Social Security can be expected to reduce the labor supply if the time of retirement is endogenous. In essence, Social Security acts as a tax on earnings for those remaining on the job after the normal re tirement age.
While important, the results discussed above were derived from models ' which abstracted from uncertainty. It is the purpose of this paper to develop ® life cycle model which highlights the role of uncertainty. The model is then used to re-examine the effects of Social Security on private saving, the labor/leisure choice, and social welfare. It is shown that in an uncertain world, a fully funded Social Security program will not, in general, drive out an equivalent amount of private saving. Even if the program is actuarially fair from an individual's point of view, a fully funded plan can be expected to alter the supply of labor. Within the context of our model, it is shown that-in the absence of uncertainty--private decisions are optimal; at best, a Social Security plan will have no real effects. However, we shall show that under uncertainty, private decisions will not, in general, be optimal even if individuals have rational expectations. Consequently, some scope exists for social policy to produce an improvement in social welfare, and it will be demonstrated that a Social Security scheme exists that will produce an effi cient allocation of resources. Perhaps our most interesting results concern second best Social Security plans, i.e. those which distort labor decisions.
It is shown that distortionary plans exist that lead to an improvement in social welfare.
At this point some caveats concerning the nature of our model are in order. It is assumed that individuals live for two periods; choosing the division of time between labor and leisure in the first, but retired in the second. Thus, as opposed to Feldstein and Hu, we do not allow for work during the second period of life. Individuals in their first period of life must make the interrelated decisions of how much to work, consume and save for the second period of life. We assume that population is constant, that output is not storable and that labor is the only factor of production. Thus, money is the only store of value, and we cannot analyze the effects of Social Security taxes on growth paths k la Diamond, Hu, and Samuelson. Lastly, we do not con sider the transition during which the Social Security program is being imple mented. Readers interested in such issues should see Flemming. Yet, we do not believe that these simplifications are overly severe for they serve to highlight•the role of uncertainty. Uncertainty enters the model in the form of a stochastic production function disturbance.
Given this exogenous output uncertainty, the overall price level and the value of ones savings for re tirement are also uncertain. proportional to income, social security is a means to transfer income from high to low output generations. If risk averse individuals do not know whether they will be members of a high or low output generation, they will, in general, prefer some form of intergenerational risk sharing.
The first section of the paper develops the model and shows that in .the absence of uncertainty, fully-funded Social Security plans will have--at best--no real effects. The second section of the paper presents our theoretical T, results concerning Social Security schemes. Some of the effects of Social Security depend upon the form of the utility function and the distribution of the exogenous output disturbance. The third section of the paper presents simulation results for various distributions of the disturbances and par^eters for the class of additive -constant relative risk aversion utility functions.
Conclusions and directions for further research are presented in the last section of the paper.
I.
The Model
In accord with the basic life cycle approach, we assume:
(i) Individuals live for only two periods; thus, an individual of generatioh t is born at the beginning of t and dies at the end of period t+1.
(ii) The individual can work only in the first period of his life, but consumes in both periods.
(iii) Individual utility -for a member of generation t -is given by:
= U(l-L|., c', where:
= work in t; (1-L^) = leisure = consumption in j by a member of generation t; j=t, t+1. . (v) Aggregate output is linear in total labor supply; output for each period is subject to a random disturbance. This disturbance is identical for members of the same generation. Further, the output disturbance for different generations is identically, but indepen dently, distributed.
(vi) A Social Security plan exists whereby an individual pays a constant fraction of his earned income in taxes, and receives a transfer during retirement. More will be said on this later.
(vii) Individuals choose their labor supply and consumption decisions to maximize expected utility; furthermore, they have rational expecta tions, i.e. their subjective probability distributions are identical with the true probability distributions.
(viii) Money is the only store of value for individuals, as commodities are
• assumed perishable. Further, the money stock is constant (so that Social Security benefits in t equal tax revenues in t).
(ix) Commodity prices -and their distribution -are determined by aggregate equilibrium.
Mathematically, let:
(1) = the labor supply of individual i of generation t, In general, the transfers to be received are random; assuming full-funding, i.e., no money creation, so that transfers at t equal taxes at t:
(6) Rt = T-P,-A^L^, where Is aggregate transfers at t to members of generation (t-1). Further, let: On the other hand, the flat rebate scheme will affect the allocation of resources, since it decreases the real return to labor; that is, if an indi vidual agent chooses to work an extra hour, his net first period income increases by P(1-t), whereas his net benefits in the next period are unaltered.
Assuming both goods are net substitutes for leisure, and that leisure and both good are normal, it can readily be shown that the net effect of plan (2) Thus, we see that in a world of certainty, there is no positive role to be played by Social Security taxes within a model like ours. At best, a proportional rebate plan (scheme 1) has no real effect but does increase prices; a flat rebate plan (scheme 2) distorts decisions and leads to ineffi ciency.
We now turn, to analyze the impact of these plans under uncertainty for additive, constant relative risk aversion utility functions.
II. Impact of Social Security Schemes for Specific Utility Functions
For tractability, we assume each agent's utility function is additive and exhibits constant relative risk aversion:
For p = 0, (12) reduces to :
In the above equations, \(^1) represents the rate of time preference. Note that p measures the degree of risk aversion (as well as the degree of substitutability among commodities); specifically, (1-p) is the (absolute value of the) degree of relative risk aversion.
A) The Logarithmic Case
We take this -the easiest case -first. Individual beliefs governing prices are given by (9). Given L^, the individual chooses^C^to maximize: (12") U= Ind-L^:) + In \ E ln[V*^^]; or:
, where:
In (13) - (14), Pj., A^, and are known, the distribution of is deter mined by (9), and that of depends on the specific Social Security plan.
(13) determines the consumption demand, ( P^. . . .) given expectations,
Substituting into (12')and maximizing expected utility over -before and A are known -yields:
In (15), we use the fact that:
Thus, (15) determines as dependent only on expectations; substituting into yields consumption demand as a function of P^, A^and expectations.
Since all agents are identical and the system is stationary, Substituting (14) - (18) In (13) yields:
Since all agents are identical, = y^. = y^, = L /N and:
Note that (21) must hold for all A^; hence y^is independent of A^; further, the functions y^and must be identical. Therefore, the solutions to (21) ;are:
Before discussing! the cause of the multiple equilibrium, let us solve for L^. For plan (1):
For plan (2): 3rJ:.i (24) =T A^^^^=0.
Let Lj be individual labor supply under Social Security plan j; substitution into (15) yields:
Finally, utility is determined from (12'), given:
(27) = A^^^(L^/N)(l-y).
Thus:
Now that all the calculations are performed, some discussion is in order.
The first point to note is that there are two consumption rules that are con sistent with rational expectations; this is a familiar case of selffulfilling expectations. Suppose that individuals at t believe all individu als at (t+1) will do no private savings = (1-t)); in this case it is clear their money balances will be worthless, and hence they have no incentive to save (yj.= (l-T)). This belief, then, that money has no value is a selffulfilling one; and note that, while it is consistent with rational expecta tions, it is inefficient (unless t happens to be \/l+\)).
Let us concentrate, then, on the alternative solution 3^=[1/(1+X)], clearly, the consumption rule is independent of Further, for plan (1), is also independent of Tj hence, the proportional Social Security plan has no real ef fect in this case (as in the case of certainty), its only effect being nominalto increase prices as t increases.
On the other hand, for the flat rebate plan (2) Let us now consider the rational expectations equilibrium for p^. Given Pj,, A^, L^, the individual chooses to maximize expected utility using (14):
we find:
Substituting in (29):
Optimizing over L yields:
Equations (36) 
Using (9) -the price determination equation -and the identity of agents -(39) reduces to:
Vl Since the LHS (left hand side) of (40) must hold for all A^, it follows that y depends only on A and t; and is independent of L. :
(41)^|o as p|0. . Given the solution, y(A), the individual labor supply decision for each plan is determined from (38); after some simplification we find; for plan (1):
AP(y(Ap)P'^] +\tE which, given the distributions, could (theoretically) be solved for Lj^. For^t +1 plan (2), -« 0, and (38) reduces to:
ain, given the distribution of A, this could (theoretically) be solved for L^* Thus, (40) and (43) or (44) X^'P /(1+X )j , no solution to (40') exists; hence, for T > t , (47) L^(t*) =l/[(l+X^"P/^(e(aP)^+1_
Thus, for the proportional plan, the efficient allocation can be achieved by a tax rate of (t ) ; in the absence of this plan, private decisions would be inef ficient .Î n addition, one could readily demonstrate the impact of changes in the tax rate on expected utility and labor supply. From (37): 
For the proportional plan, the first expression in brackets on the RHS is zero, as can be seen from (43). In addition, it can be demonstrated that the second expression on the RHS is positive for T < t ; hence, expected utility is monotonically increasing in t -up to the optimal tax rate -for this planJ Also, from (43) we can determine how the labor supply is affected by the tax rate:
(1-L ) (50) (1-p)^=p.E AP(yP \(l-y)P^)|^J^0as p^0, for t <T* 1 Thus, increases in the tax rate can either raise or lower the labor supply de pending on the degree of risk aversion. Note that there is no presumption that the actual labor supply will be decreased as a result of the tax-transfer plan.
Consider next the second tax scheme -the one in which the next period transfer is independent of current effort. From (43) and (44) it is immedi ately apparent that, for t > 0, less labor will be supplied under plan 2 than plan 1: for t > 0. Intuitively, this is quite reasonable since this second scheme lowers the (expected) return to labor, therefore causing indi viduals to substitute leisure for consumption (and labor).
The impact of this tax plan on expected utility can be found from substi tuting (44) into (49) and simplifying:
Consider (51) first; since the second term on the RHS in (51) is positive, it immediately follows that, for t®0, a small increase in the tax rate will increase expected utility. Thus, for small tax rates, the benefits of intergenerational risk-sharing dominate the costs imposed by the labor distortion introduced by the plan.
However, as the tax rate increases, the net impact of further increases in it on expected utility are ambiguous; on the one hand, it is beneficial because of the risk-sharing, but on the other hand, the decrease in the labor g supply induced by higher taxes lowers expected utility. Consequently, for "k this second best plan, there will be an optimal tax rate t < t ; the magnitude of this tax rate will, in general, depend upon p. As it is impossible to pro vide an analytic solution for this "second-best" tax rate, in the next section we shall provide some simulation experiments that estimate its value.
To sum up the results of this section, we have found for the proportional tax plan that:
(i) there exists an optimal tax rate that supports the efficient allocation;
(ii) individual expected utility is increasing in the tax rate, for tax rates less than the optimal rate; (iii) the effect on labor supply depends on the degree of risk aversion;
higher tax rates -under this plan -can either raise or lower actual labor supply. In contrast, for the flat tax plan, in which transfers are independent of that individual's labor supply, we have seen that:
(iv) labor supply is always lower under this plan than under the propor tional plan (t>0);
(v) due to substitution effects -the net intact of the tax is to lower labor supply; '
(vi) the effect of increases in the tax rate on expected utility is am biguous, due to offsetting effects of labor distortions and risk-sharing. How ever, for T near zero, increases in t increase expected utility, whereas for T near t they decrease it. Consequently, a positive optimal tax rate exists for this plan. In the next section we provide simulation results that calcu late this optimal tax rate, and show how its value depends on p and the variance of A.
III. Simulation Results
In the previous section, it was shown that for the proportional tax plan, increases in the tax rate, up to the optimal rate, increase (decrease) the supply of labor if p is positive (negative). Further, the optimal tax rate is given by:
(53) T* . p 0.
However, for the flat rebate plan it was not possible to obtain analytic solutions for the second best tax rate or to demonstrate whether labor supply and expected utility are monotonic for a less-than-optimum tax rate. In this 9 section we simulate the model in order to provide the magnitudes of changes under the proportional plan and to find the optimum tax rate in the distortionary scheme. Furthermore, we also discuss the extent to which Social Security taxation alters private saving.
A) Consumption and Labor Supply Effects
We simulate the model using the general form of the utility function given by equation (12) this set of simulations, tax rates between 0.0 and .5 were considered at in tervals no greater than .01. We examined all p in the range 0.9 to -.9 at intervals of .1 for values of \ = 1.0 and 0.8. Fortunately, the endogenous variables in the system (including expected utility) are monotonic in p, X, and Var (A) so that only selected results need be presented. Another set of simulations considered the case in which the output disturbance was drawn from a log-^normal distribution. As the qualitative results appear to be robust to the form of the distribution, we present a single example of the case in which the output disturbance is log-normally distributed. Table 1 presents the optimal tax rates for alternative values of p and the rate of time preference. Notice that the'optimal tax rates for the pro portional plan are distribution-free and are monotonic in rho if \ < 1.0.
Also, note that--as demonstrated by equation (50)--there is a positive tax
rate that maximizes expected utility for the distortionary Social Security scheme,
In Table 1 the optimal tax rates for plan 2 are such that each satisfies the maximization problem in equations (51) and (52). Further, as discussed above,
the optimal tax rate t is always greater than the tax rate that maximizes expected utility under the distortionary scheme (t)• Probably the most important demonstration in Table 1 is that the "second-best" optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the variance of the output disturbance. This is easily .2468
.5
.3640
.4081
.5 .4307
.4536
.5 .4602
.5 .4652
.5 .4690
Flat rebateV .
030
.025
.010
.045
.090
.145
Var (A) = .64^. 1) The supply of labor under the proportional tax scheme is always greater than that of the distortionary scheme for corresponding tax rates not equal to zero.
2) Under the flat rebate plan, increases'in the tax rate strongly discourage work. For the proportional plan, increasing the tax rate may act to increase or decrease the supply of labor depending upon the degree of relative risk aversion and whether t -T . The supply of labor is.maxi-' mized (minimized) at a tax rate of t if p is positive (negative). Note: The average propensities to consume are invariant to the tax scheme. Thus, the figures above are the average propensity to consume under either plan.
supply or average propensity to consume (but not both).
4)
It is of interest to note that under either tax scheme, the smaller is rho, the greater is the supply of labor. Thus, the. results do not bear out the claim that risk aversion would induce individuals to substitute the certainty of leisure for the uncertainty of market activities. Rather as risk aversion increases, individuals are drawn into work activities in 10 order to provide for consumption in retirement.
Notice that the direction of change of the labor supply and average propensity to consume depend upon the sign of p. Consider first the case in which rho is positive. Clearly--as indicated by equation (41) consume a smaller proportion of their output than is socially optimal and highoutput generations will consume a larger proportion than is socially optimal.
To see why this is important, consider the special case in which \=1 so that y =.5. When the actual value of y is .5, a generation that has an output, say 50%, lower (higher) than average will reduce (increase) its consumption by 507o. The retired generation will find that real cash balances purchase 50% fewer (more) goods than average. Thus, both generations share equally in the output uncertainty. In the case under consideration, however, low-output generations will reduce their consumption by a relatively small amount (as y<. 5) and high-;output generations will increase their consumption by a relatively large amount (as y>.5). As such, there tends to be less intergenerational T ie risk sharing. Increases in the tax rate, for t<t act to spread the uncertainty across generations. In doing so, as can be seen from Table 2 , individuals will be drawn into work activities under the proportional tax scheme. With the flat rebate plan, the distortionary effects are to reduce the supply of labor.
Thus, the flat rebate plan reduces consumption uncertainty at the expense of distorting the labor supply decision.
Again considering positive values for p, the larger is the variance of the output disturbance, the smaller is the supply of labor. High-output variance also acts to decrease the average propensity to consume of lowoutput generations and increase the average propensity to consume of highoutput generations. Thus, output uncertainty acts to move the economy away from the optimal consumption and labor supply rules.
Considering the case in which people are very risk averse (p<0), high tax rates -act to decrease the supply of labor and to decrease (increase) the average propensity to consume of low (high) output generations. High output variance acts to increase the supply of labor and to move the average propensity to consume away from y . In this case, the supply of labor will be less than L for all t < t ; and y > y for low-output generations, but y < y for high-output generations.
Combined with Section XI, the simulation results indicate that Social Security can pool risks intergenerationally. For risk averse individuals, then, social welfare can be increased by resorting to an intergenerational transfer of commodities via Social Security taxation. These results appear to be quite robust to the distribution of the output disturbances. In Table   4 , we present the effects of the two Social Security plans on labor supply and expected utility when disturbances are log-normally distributed. The direction of change in expected utility and work effort are in complete accord with the results for the binomial distribution. When rho is positive (and \ = 1), an increase in the tax rate acts to increase labor supply under the proportional plan and reduce it with a flat rebate. Expected utility is largest under the proportional plan with a tax rate of .5. Note We now consider the effects of Social Security taxation on saving deci sions. While money is the only asset in the model, and the nominal money supply is fixed because we only consider fully funded Social Security programs, the private sector can alter saving via changes in the price level. Recall from equation (9) that the real value of cash balances is given by:
(9)^=AtLj(l-T)-C^.
As real cash balances can be considered to be total private saving (net of Social Security), equation (9) indicates that actual or realized saving will be dependent upon the realization of A^. Thus, it is meaningful to consider re alized private savings (M/P or R|S) and expected private savings (E[M/P ] or EPS).
Additionally, it is possible to consider the amount that the retired genera tion consumes (M/P^. + the rebate) and the amount the retired generation can be expected to consume (i.e., expected private saving plus the expected re bate), or expected total saving (ETS). Thus, expected total saving is given positive, less than a dollar-for-dollar reduction occurs for the proportional plan.
The effects of output variations on saving are not always monptonic.
However, under either tax plan, if rho is positive, increasing the variance of the output disturbance acts to reduce both EPS and ETS for all tax rates less 
IV. Conclusions
We have shown that in an uncertain world, fully funded Social Security programs can increase social welfare and affect individual labor supply, con sumption and .saving decisions. This result was derived from a model in which individuals maximize expected utility and have rational expectations. Thus, there are economic reasons-as opposed to irrationality or myopia-which can be used to justify fully funded Social Security programs. Social Security can be used as a means to spread exogenous output and endogenous price uncertainty across generations.
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The major limitation of our model is that we assume money is the only store of value. Allowing for storable commodities would certainly change many of our results. However, few commodities can be stored risk-free so that there are few ways to risklessly transfer consumption' intertemporally. We also believe that it would be useful to consider Social Security programs in the context of a model that does allow for some--albeit risky--commodity storage. State University. We would like to thank Roy Gardner for his suggestions.
We assume no bequest motive exists, so the new generation starts with no money; the money holdings of a member of the older generation equal the difference between that individual's net income and consumption expenditures from the previous period.
Of course, since all individuals are alike, ex post the transfer to all individuals of the same generation will be identical. However, the two plans lead to different labor supply decisions since the individual, in choosing his labor-supply decision, (correctly) assumes his choice does not affect other agents. In other words, if individual 1 were to choose a suboptimal labor decision, this would not induce others to do likewise. Con sequently, under plan 1, an individual pays tax on each extra hour worked, but also receives an increase in expected benefits, whereas under plan 2 there is ho offsetting increase in benefits due to an increase in L^. Also, the general price level will tend to increase as the tax rate increases, since the demand for money will decrease. In particular, for tax rates less than 50%, prices must increase as t increases.
It should also be noted that this solution maximizes the expected value of a Bergsonian Social Welfare function that is additive in individual utilities.
Details are omitted to conserve space; a proof is available from the authors upon request.
If a private insurance system could be established whereby individuals pledged ex ante to contribute t* of the income in their work period in return for a comparable remuneration next period, then this plan would -of courseachieve an efficient allocation without government intervention. The problems that seem to arise for this scheme are; (i) how does the insurance company enforce its contract; people with an unusually good outcome for At may try to opt out (cancel) their plan. Hence, contracts must be made ex ante and must be enforceable; (ii) how does an individual know any one company will be sol vent next period?; if 30% of the population engages in an insurance contract with company B, and only 25% join next year, the company cannot fulfill its contract. Hence, either there must be only one company, or agents must have perfect foresight (not just rational expectations) as to what insurance en rollments will be next period. While a private insurance plan might work in such an environment, it seems that it is logically equivalent to a government plan, and the government programs seem to reduce the uncertainty concerning enforcement of contracts and membership enrollments.
The proof that E[A^(yP^-\(l.-y)^t < t , ot is rather tedious; since this demonstration would add little insight, it is omitted in order to conserve space. Interested readers may obtain a proof from the authors. g For p > 0, labor effort monotonically decreases as the tax rate . increases; for p < 0, we have not been able to show that labor effort mono tonically declines with higher taxes. However, since labor effort under this
